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Abstract—We present a practical method for protecting data
during the inference phase of deep learning based on bipartite
topology threat modeling and an interactive adversarial deep net-
work construction. We term this approach Privacy Partitioning.
In the proposed framework, we split the machine learning models
and deploy a few layers into users’ local devices, and the rest
of the layers into a remote server. We propose an approach to
protect user’s data during the inference phase, while still achieve
good classification accuracy.
We conduct an experimental evaluation of this approach
on benchmark datasets of three computer vision tasks. The
experimental results indicate that this approach can be used
to significantly attenuate the capacity for an adversary with
access to the state-of-the-art deep network’s intermediate states
to learn privacy-sensitive inputs to the network. For example,
we demonstrate that our approach can prevent attackers from
inferring the private attributes such as gender from the Face
image dataset without sacrificing the classification accuracy of
the original machine learning task such as Face Identification.
I. INTRODUCTION
Presently, deep learning has been established as the most
widely used machine learning solution. The popularity of
the deep neural network (DNN) is due in large part to its
effectiveness and applicability to a wide variety of complex
tasks, and its relative ease of use compared to other machine
learning solutions [1]–[5]. The efficacy of the deep learning so-
lutions have also benefited significantly from broad technology
trends such as improved computational power, increased inter-
networking capacity, and a proliferation of massive structured
datasets and data streaming sources.
The capacity for deep networks to leverage massive datasets
has drawn interest from a privacy-leery public and secu-
rity researchers – leading to proposals for privacy-preserving
protection mechanisms. However, recent works on protect-
ing data privacy of deep learning [6], [7] largely focus on
protecting training data during the model learning phase
using differential privacy, whereas deep learning services
potentially pose a more significant privacy threat during the
model inference phase where more user data is processed.
Recently, cryptography-based protocols are also proposed [8],
[9] to protect data privacy in model inference phase. How-
ever, these protocols impose computation overhead on model
inference and it is not feasible for those deep models with
cryptography-based protocols to be deployed in computational
low-performing devices such as IoT devices. Researchers also
proposed differential-privacy-based solutions for protecting
aggregated data during inference phase. However, these so-
lutions don’t protect individual user data during the model
inference phase.
In this work, we propose a new framework for protecting
user data during the model inference phase where users
use their data to get classification results. The output of a
deep learning neural network construction is comprised of
multiple intermediate layers that encode information regarding
the previous layers, providing a channel for unauthorized
access to privacy-sensitive data. We consider the case that
an adversary whose goal is to recover input data or extract
sensitive information from the input data for the request of
deep learning services and the adversary can have complete
access to the remote party who offers the deep learning
services. For example, a malware on the cloud server can get
access to the intermediate layers of a face detection classifier
to infer the emotions of the users when the user just wants the
camera in their smartphone to track their face.
We then present a practical method for attenuating the
privacy risk potential of intermediate layers in deep learning
inference tasks – a framework we term Privacy Partitioning.
Deep neural networks Θ in this framework are partitioned
resulting in bipartite network {Θl,Θr} and access to the
network’s inputs it restricted to Θl (Figure 1). During the
model training phase, we optimize the machine learning model
to only share information about the expected utility of the
data such as face identification, and avoid disclosing private
information such as the emotional information to the remote
layers. As a result, when the users are using the model during
the inference phase, their emotional data will not be easily
extracted from the remote layers.
Privacy Partitioning attenuates the privacy risk potential
of one part of a deep network (i.e., remote partition Θr)
to the other part of the deep network (i.e., local partition
Θl). The privacy partitioning framework is itself an instance
of centralized learning with key adaptations that support a
bipartite data privacy threat model. This adaptation compatible
and composable with other deep learning security and privacy
protection mechanisms [6], [7], enables the service provider
to protect trade secrets (e.g., the intellectual property of
DNNs) more readily, and enables machine learning engineers
to readily implement privacy partitions without the additional
learning curve of cryptographic protection.
The privacy partitioning framework is composed of two
primary components: (i) a bipartite topology (Figure 1) and
(ii) an interactive adversarial deep neural network construction
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Fig. 1: Bipartite Deep Network Topology: This figure depicts
a bipartite deployment context and privacy model applied to
deep convolutional neural network Θ. Partition Θl is the local
computing context. Partition Θr is the remote computing context.
Hidden state H is the output of the last local transformation layer
Li and the input of the first remote transformation layer Li+1.
Given deep network Θ and activation state H, this framework
generates bipartite network {Θl,Θr} that learns model fθ : X →
Y while attenuating the capacity of attackers to learn function
fθa : H → X and private attributes from the recovered inputs.
(Figure 2). These two aspects enable a two-part data privacy
and deployment model where the local partitionΘl is restricted
to authorized users whereas the remote partition Θr may
be safely entrusted to honest-but-curious remote parties and
deployed in a potentially malicious computing context.
The bipartite topology is motivated by it’s apt applicability
to many computing use cases featuring a local-vs-remote
bipartite threat model including client to server context, local
edge network to remote cloud contexts, and use cases requiring
offloading from constrained devices to untrusted resource-rich
proximate infrastructure. The interactive adversarial approach
to constructing a privacy partitioning (the focus of Section IV)
is inspired in part by cybernetics theory – where learning a
skill is understood to be a feedback and refinement process
– and by game theory – where optimal decision-making is
arrived at through iterative simulations of independent and
competing actors in a strategic game. In our context of privacy
partitionings, the skill the deep network is tasked with learning
is to adapt a reference network in such a way that the
remote partition receives less information about inputs while
maintaining the accuracy of the reference network. Similarly,
the strategic game is between a defense oracle Θd, competing
to battle harden bipartite network {Θl,Θr} by optimizing for
recovery accuracy before the convergence of the Stochastic
Gradient Descent (SGD) algorithm.
Contributions. In this study we present Privacy Partitioning,
a practical privacy protection framework for model inference
phase. In summary, this work makes the following contribu-
tions:
• We propose a novel framework for learning accurate deep
networks that are resilient against input recovery attacks
during model inference phase (Section IV).
• Unlike past research for protecting aggregated data during
model inference phase, we propose a solution to achieve
a balance between the utility and privacy of the individual
data for model inference (Section II).
• We experimentally demonstrate the effectiveness of our
approach. In all experiments, the results indicate that the
privacy partitioning framework can significantly reduce
the privacy risk potential of using deep network activation
states to learn the inputs to the network (Section V).
Organization. The topic of the next section, Section II, is the
problem definition including the deployment model, adversary
model, assumptions, and desired properties. Section III cov-
ers some preliminary background information regarding our
work. Section IV presents the proposed framework. Section V
presents experimental results for the privacy protection mech-
anism proposed here using three computers vision classi-
fier networks. Section VI discusses the related literature and
Section VII presents a summary of conclusions.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
A. Model and Assumptions
Deployment Model.
Our use case defines outsourced computation in the sense
advocated by the hybrid public cloud and edge computing
deployment models. In particular, we consider the case where
the users want to get classification results of their data from a
remote server and still want to protect the privacy of their data.
Accordingly, we identify the following four key stakeholders
and their primary roles:
(i) The cloud provider (remote admin) offers data center-
based compute, storage, and network resources (i.e., the re-
mote computing context) as-a-service to cloud customers who
wish to lease them for a certain amount of time.
(ii) The edge provider (local admin) offers edge network-
based compute, storage, and network resources (i.e., the local
computing context) as-a-platform for use by the network of
co-located users and embedded devices. Local admins are
interested in ensuring that all services deployed within the
local domain adhere to its security and privacy requirements.
(iii) The service provider (app) wishes to lease both edge
computing and cloud computing resources to deploy services
with protections that are robust against the threats indicated in
the adversary model.
Finally, (iv) the end user (user device) wishes to use
authorized apps, guaranteeing the integrity and confidentiality
of network interactions within the local domain and the privacy
of data requested by shared deep learning models.
Adversary Model.
In the case of centralized learning, the entirety of deep
network Θ is deployed to a single computing context managed
by a single administrative domain. The threat model defined
here involves a bipartite topology and privacy policy managed
by two administrative domains: the data custodian (local
admin) and the cloud computing provider (remote admin). This
threat model addresses a commonly occurring deployment
context and data privacy requirement where a data prove-
nance/handling domain would like to safely leverage remote
compute resources on behalf of its users.
The local admin, would like to restrict data access to
the local computing context. The remote admin, provides
the computing resources comprising the remote computing
context. Bipartite learning results in transformation of Θ to
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{Θl · Θr} where the local partition Θl is the portion of
deep network Θ managed by the local admin and the remote
partition Θr is the portion of deep network Θ managed by the
remote admin (see Figure 1).
We consider the privacy of inputs to deep network {Θl ·Θr}
during the inference phase given an adversary with complete
access to the remote computing contextΘr. The goal of the ad-
versary is to recover input data that contains private attributes
given outputs of the local partition Θl (i.e., intermediate state),
access to all hidden states generated within Θr, and access
to network output. Thus the adversary could be an attacker
who gains access to the traffic between the Θl and Θr, a
malicious agent who gains unauthorized access to the remote
computing context, or a remote admin who wants to infer more
information from user data.
Assumptions.
A modicum level of trust for the servers managing the pro-
cess is required. The servers comprising the local computing
context are trusted to securely collect user inputs as well as to
securely manage the cryptographic assets and access control
policies of the individuals and devices within the local domain.
Thus we consider data compromises resulting from the local
computing context out of scope. Additionally, we consider
side-channel style inference attacks beyond the scope of this
work. The servers constituting local and remote computing
contexts are trusted to operate normally (i.e., we consider the
denial of service style attacks out of scope).
We assume that bipartite network {Θl ·Θr} is trained using
the process described in Section IV and experimentally eval-
uated in Section V. This threat model deals with data privacy
protection during the model inference phase. Therefore, the
attacker may know, may partially know, or may not know
the dataset that is used during the training phase to train and
validate bipartite network {Θl·Θr}. Although this threat model
does not assume that the attacker has access to training data,
we evaluate the privacy partitioning framework in Section V
using the strong attackers who does utilize the same training
data that was used to learn {Θl ·Θr}.
B. Desired Properties
The following list contains the desired properties for the
Privacy Partitioning.
P1 Utility. We would like the following objectives to be
satisfied:
P1.1 Performant. Protections result in a negligible re-
duction to model accuracy.
P1.2 Learning-Based. Protections do not require pro-
cesses that are outside of the deep learning tool-set
such as managing cryptographic secrets.
P2 Versatility. We would like the following objectives to
be satisfied:
P2.1 Compatible. Protections can be readily applied to
existing deep networks.
P2.2 Complementary. Protections can be readily de-
ployed alongside end-to-end security and privacy
protection mechanisms.
III. BACKGROUND
In this section, we present several background topics related
to the basics of deep learning and the deep learning deploy-
ment typologies in collaborative setting.
A. The Basics of Deep Learning
In our work, we focus on the setting of supervised learning
for simplicity. A deep learning model fθ : X → Y pa-
rameterized by θ. For the classification problems, X is high
dimensional vector space and Y is the space for the classes.
Given a labeled dataset {(xi, yi)}
m′
i=1 where (xi, yi) ∈ X ×Y .
The dataset is usually partitioned into training data of size m
and test data.
In order to learn a good DNN model that perform well on
the test data, we will try to minimize the loss function l which
measures the difference between ground truth labels and the
predicted labels:
min
θ
1
m
m∑
i=1
l
(
yi, fθ(xi)
)
The loss function is usually optimized gradient-based opti-
mization algorithm such as SGD. Popular choices of fθ in the
application of deep learning include Multilayer Perceptrons
(MLPs), Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) and Recur-
rent Neural Networks (RNNs).
B. Deep Learning in Collaborative Setting
Consider the case where N users of a mobile app each
collect and store personal data locally on their mobile devices.
The goal of collaborative deep learning is to leverage a deep
network that incorporates the data of all N user devices to,
for example, produce relevant personalized services for each
user.
Due to the potentially sensitive nature of personal data we
would like to achieve a high-performance deep network while
simultaneously providing strong data privacy guarantees for all
participants. That is, we would like to maximize the accuracy
of learned model while minimizing the amount of individual
attributes that can be leaked or inferred about participant-
we would like to establish privacy-preserving collaborative
learning. Individual attributes include recovered raw input data
as well associated personally-identifiable user attributes such
as identity, interests, habits, and social network.
In general, there are two architectural approaches to learn
large-scale deep networks: centralized learning and distributed
learning. The choice between the two (as well as the spectrum
of topologies spanning them) have differing implications for
performance, scalability, ease of deployment, and data privacy.
Centralized Learning. Traditionally, machine learning frame-
works have assumed access to a centralized repository of data
(or otherwise considered data mining and curation tasks as
independent of, and generally beyond the scope of, model
learning) even in the case of collaborative learning tasks
requiring access to massive personally-identifiable privacy-
sensitive datasets.
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The centralized approach is developer-friendly, since a sin-
gle operator can manage the entire process. Production-grade
deep networks will often utilize protocol-agnostic data protec-
tion measures such as end-to-end encryption for secure data
transfer over public networks and organizational consumer
protection measures such as terms of service agreements,
enabling the deep network itself to be free of complexity
and performance overheads due to protocol-level support
for privacy protection. However, these peripheral protection
measures provide data confidentiality instead of data secrecy.
Thus, even in the best case, these measures do not directly
diminish the potential for privacy intrusion or large scale mis-
handling of personal information–instead relying on implicit
trust agreements between individuals and service providers and
on accountability measures for deterrence and recompense. In
the worst case, large central repositories of highly-structured
data provide significant points of failure for unauthorized
access.
Distributed Learning. Researchers have proposed a variety of
decentralized architectures as solutions to both performance
and privacy. Decentralized deep learning (also known as
distributed or federated deep learning) includes proposals for
building and updating a unified model without the need to store
individual data in the cloud and proposals that combine both a
personalized individual model managed locally on user devices
and a shared model constructed from anonymity averaged
data [6], [7].
In principle, distributed learning approaches enable partici-
pants to enjoy the full benefits of rich shared models without
the need to centrally stored data. This benefit often comes
at the expense of increased complexity due to asynchronous
operations and an assorted computing and data management
context. Additionally, fully distributed learning implementa-
tions may complicate attempts to protect the trade secrets and
intellectual property of the DNNs.
IV. FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present the privacy partitioning frame-
work: a novel method for learning accurate deep networks that
are resilient against input recovery attacks.
A. Bipartite Topology Design
We consider the case where a local admin manages N
devices. We define a local computing context managed by
the local admin in the sense advocated by the mobile edge
computing and fog computing paradigms–where the local
computing context represents a spatiotemporal domain of
data streaming sources such as a connected car, a smart
home, an enterprise network, a university campus, a smart
city, or connected regional infrastructure. In the context of
spatiotemporally defined computing domains, a local domain
represents a single operating domain even though this domain
may contain many data streaming elements all operated by
different users and all serving different purposes (e.g., a smart
home with connected embedded devices, network elements,
displays, CPUs, sensors, and actuators).
These N devices fall under the domain of the local com-
puting context due to their proximity to the same set of users.
Collectively, the devices of local computing context collect
and store personal and contextual data regarding the users and
activities within the domain. The local computing context is
also responsible for sending out processed user’s data which
the user ask for machine learning services to the remote
server. In the remainder of the paper, we use the terms local
computing context, local domain, and local computing nodes
interchangeably. We use the term local partition (denoted by
Θl) to refer to the part of the deep network that is run
on the local computing context. Similarly, we use the the
terms remote computing context, remote domain, and remote
computing nodes interchangeably. And we use the term remote
partition (denoted by Θr) to refer to the part of the deep
network that is run on the remote computing context.
Please note that, even though we present privacy parti-
tionings in the context of local area networks comprised of
co-present connected devices, privacy partitionings may be
applied in any other contexts that call for bipartite privacy
policy with a privacy-hardened local computing context. In
general, the ideal problems utilizing the privacy partitioning
framework have these aspects: (i) deep learning tasks where
it is required or advantageous to decouple data handling and
model inference tasks (ii) when the data entrusted to a deep
network is privacy-sensitive (iii) when the deep learning model
is sufficiently complex to see performance increases from
outsourced computation (iv) when it’s advantageous to support
network-layer-based or user-domain-based controls that adjust
the trade-off between privacy and performance.
Another component of our framework is the remote domain.
The remote domain receives processed user data for machine
learning services and also provide the end-users with machine
learning services. Due to the contextual and potentially sen-
sitive nature of this data, the remote domain is trusted to run
deep learning model Θ but not trusted with access to raw user
data. The high-level goal of the framework is to train a highly-
accurate deep learning model that incorporates personal and
contextual data from a local domain while leveraging remote
compute resources residing in the remote domain for deep
learning services. Next, we describe an interactive adversarial
deep network construction designed to achieve this end.
B. Model Learning Phase
Intuitively, an initial motivation for computing a portion of
the deep network locally is because the hidden states of the
successive layers contain more transformations, resulting in
less a traceable representation with regards to the attributes of
the original inputs to the network.
However, this initial measure is not enough because an at-
tacker can, in many cases, generate a fairly accurate estimation
of the raw input data set X from the output of the local layers
H (i.e., the attacker can compute fθa : H → X .
A privacy partitioned deep network should meet two goals.
(i) Bipartite network {Θl,Θr} should be a functional ap-
proximation of reference deep network Θ–i.e., the resulting
model should achieve good performance. (ii) It should be
4
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Fig. 2: Model Learning and Model Inference: This figure illustrates the two phases of deploying privacy partition protections to a
deep network: (a) the learning phase and (b) the inference phase. The learning phase encompasses several machine learning activities
including parameter tuning using training and validation datasets. The inference phase refers to processing inputs from end users after
the network has been deployed. During the learning phase, deep network Θ is first partitioned into a bipartite topology {Θl, Θr} and
defender Θd, acting as an oracle for attacker behavior, is added as a feedback mechanism for minimizing the potential of recovering input
X via hidden state H (see Equation 2). During the inference phase, when bipartite network {Θl, Θr} has been deployed, the adversary
devises counterpart networks that each attempt to recover X from H .
prohibitively difficult for an attacker to recover raw input data
given the output of local layers. Therefore, when training the
models, we need to optimize the objective function so that
model performance is maintained as the potential for an input
recovery is lessened.
In effect, we would like to prevent the attacker from
recovering the inputs by ensuring the local layer operations
are irreversible. In order to achieve this, we introduce an
additional component into the model learning phase: defender
(Θd). The role of the defender is to simulate the attackers.
That is, the defender attempts to recover the inputs given
hidden state h ∈ H. The defender network and the bipartite
network are trained concurrently with the defender providing
feedback regarding the efficacy of the privacy partitioning
during each round and the bipartite network updating it’s
function fθd : H → X based on this information (see Figure 2
(a)).
Suppose we would like to learn a deep learning model
fθ : X → Y with the training data D = {(xi, yi)}
m
i=1.
According to our bipartite design, the deep learning model
can be formulated as fθ = fθl ◦ fθr = fθr(fθl(·)), where
fθl : X → H is the function mapping from input domain
X to domain of the intermediate activation state H in local
partition Θl and fθr : H → Y is the function mapping from
H to output domain Y in remote partition Θr.
According to our design, the defender learns a mapping
function fθd : H → X and its objective can be formulated as:
min
θd
1
m
m∑
i=1
d
(
xi, fθd(fθl(xi))
)
(1)
where d
(
·, ·
)
is the privacy distance metric between the
original input and the recovered input by the defender that
measures how the original input and the recovered input differ
in sensitive information of the original input.
While training the defender, the model would leverage the
defender’s recovery performance as side information to better
optimize its parameter: to make it harder for the attacker in
the inference phase to recover input data as well as achieving
original “goal” of the model:
min
θ
1
m
m∑
i=1
l
(
yi, fθ(xi)
)
− λ · d
(
xi, fθd(fθl(xi))
)
(2)
where θ = {θl, θr}, l
(
·, ·
)
denotes the loss function for the
original task and λ is the defender weight.
C. Model Inference Phase
When the model is properly deployed according to our bi-
partite topology design in model learning phase, the adversary
wants to learn the best mapping function fθa : H → X among
all the attacker architectures he devises to recover the input of
the model using the dataset D′ = {xˆi}
n
i=1, so that whenever
new data comes out from the local computing node, it can
recover the input. Its objective function can be formulated as:
min
θa∈{θa1 ,...,θak}
min
θa
1
n
n∑
i=1
d
(
xˆi, fθa(fθl(xˆi))
)
(3)
Note the data set D′ that the attacker uses might be different
from the model’s training data. Attacker’s data can be the data
the attacker collected by himself, part of the training data set
or the whole training data in the worst case. Figure 2 shows
our framework in different phases.
D. Benefits and Trade-offs
The bipartite topology maps well the commonly occurring
dual domain access control requirement (e.g., server/client,
public/private, host/guest) and extends well to domain-based
access control in the IoT, fog computing, and edge computing
paradigms. In the next section we evaluate the framework
in terms model accuracy and protection strength to demon-
strate these protections result in negligible degradation of
performance (P1.1). The privacy partitioning framework is
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constructed using standard protocol-level mechanisms, thus,
these privacy protections do not require processes that are
outside of the deep learning tool-set (P1.2).
It can be applied directly to centralized deep learning
(P2.1). It is also complementary to decentralized architectures
and federated resource sharing model (P2.2). Recent WPA2
Krack Attack [10] demonstrates the importance of having
a layered approach to security. DNNs are so prevalent that
protection via protocol construction is useful.
This approach does introduce more components during the
model learning phase. The additional components (primarily
the defender) result in an increase in required computing
resources and time to learn a high-performance deep learning
model. However, the increased model complexity is not a sub-
stantial usability or cost barrier when compared to the baseline
cost of deploying a similar network with no protections. In
the model inference phase, since we only deploy a portion
of model layers in the local domain, it would require less
computational resources in local domain and does not cause
any overhead. Therefore, it is feasible for our framework to
be deployed in the mobile devices or IoT devices.
E. Hardening Privacy Partitioning with Defender Suites
This depiction of the model learning phase (Figure 2 (a))
shows a single defender deployed at a single deep network
partition. In practice, the privacy partitioning protections for a
given deep network fθ may be extended to include more than
one defender loss function at a given privacy partitioning. In
other words, the defender fθd can be extended to defender
suite FD={fθd0 , fθd1 , . . . , fθdD}) at the cost of increasing
computational complexity of the network, and increasing both
time it takes to train. Including more defenders at a partition
provides more robust privacy protections for the associated
hidden state since the model can leverage “best” defender
among all in the defender suite in the model learning phase,
which can be formulated as
min
θ=(θl,θr)
1
m
( m∑
i=1
l
(
yi, fθ(xi)
)
− λ min
θd∈{θ1,...,θD}
min
θd
m∑
i=1
d
(
xi, fθd(fθl(xi))
)) (4)
However, solving this optimization problem is difficult due
the complex architectures of the model and the defenders.
In practice, the model provider may train multiple defenders
individually and select choose the best defender with the
recovered inputs most similar to the inputs, and update the
parameters based on this defender in the model using iterative
optimization method like Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD).
The whole model learning process with multiple defenders is
shown in Algorithm 1.
F. Performance and Privacy Controls with Partition Suites
Another strategy for hardening the privacy partitioning
framework is to extend a bipartite network {Θl, Θr}) with
one privacy partitioning {Li,Li+1} into a partition suite
Algorithm 1: Privacy Partition with Multiple Defenders
Input : Training set D = {(xi, yi)}
m
i=1
Output : Trained model fθ
Initialize: model θ and defender suite {θd1, . . . , θdD}
for t ∈ [T ] do
for each mini-batch {xi, yi}
B
i=1 ∈ D do
1. Update the defender suite parameters
θd ∈ {θd1, . . . , θdD} via SGD using the gradient
∇θd
1
m
m∑
i=1
d
(
xi, fθd(fθl(xi))
)
2. Choose the best defender via
θd = argmin
θd∈{θd1,...,θdD}
1
B
B∑
i=1
d
(
xi, fθd(fθl(xi))
)
3. Update the model parameters θ via SGD
using the graident
∇θ
1
B
B∑
i=1
l
(
yi, fθ(xi)
)
− λ · d
(
xi, fθd(fθl(xi))
)
end
end
return θ;
({Li,Li+1}, {Lj,Lj+1}, . . . , {Lm,Lm+1}). Integration can
occur either by adding multiple partitions to a single deep
network or by training a new deep network for each partition
in the suite. Simultaneously learning more than one privacy
partitioning provides a more complete protection surface and
more deployment configuration options at the cost of addi-
tional training overhead. The additional configurations enable
flexible controls that can be adjusted in near real-time to suit
changing requirements of contextual data streams and dynamic
end-user privacy requirements.
G. Continuous Learning with Locked Local Partitions
Although the required steps for adding a privacy partitioning
occur during the model learning phase, the result is a bipartite
deep network with built-in protections for the inference phase.
For this reason, this section focuses primarily on putting the
protections in place during the learning phase whereas as the
threat model (Section II) and evaluation (Section V) focus on
the inference phase.
We now describe a process by which a privacy partitioned
bipartite deep network may be updated online to incorporate
new data. We will denote this phase as the online learning
phase to distinguish it from the learning phase described thus
far (i.e., the initial learning phase). The process for supporting
online updating of the remote partition occurs as follows:
1) initial learning phase:
a) select reference network Θ
b) select privacy partitioning point {Li,Li+1}
c) learn bipartite network {Θl,Θr}
2) online learning phase:
6
a) lock local partition Θl
b) securely generate updates fθl : X → H
c) update remote partition fθr : H → Y
d) validate and test update fθ∗ : X → Y
e) deploy bipartite network update {Θl,Θr∗}
The introduction of an online learning phase, occurring
after the initial model is learned, has the primary benefit
of completely removing any requirement to conduct data
collection and curation tasks in the remote computing context.
Our construction thus far assumes an initial learning stage
where a single administrative domain requires access the entire
topology as well as training data. During the online learn-
ing and the subsequent inference phases, the protections of
privacy partitioning extend to training, validating, and testing
processes. Thus, there is no need for a specialized single admin
learning phase after the initial learning phase used to generate
the local partition. Further, a remote admin and local admin
can negotiate an online update without having to grant training
data access to the remote computing context or requiring local
computing context to manage the entire process.
V. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we experimentally demonstrate that the pro-
posed framework can successfully defend against the attackers
described in the threat model. In the experiment setting, we
assume that all attackers have access to the full training
dataset. This assumption makes it more challenging for our
proposed solution to protect the data privacy since the attacker
can have the exact data distribution trained by the model.
Also, in practice, this can sometimes happen when the model
provider is malicious or some hackers can gain unauthorized
access to the training data.
We first discuss the metrics we used in our experiments
to evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed methodology
in the domain of for image privacy (Section V-A). Then we
evaluate the privacy partitioning adaptations to a three-layer
neural network constructed using the MNIST dataset serving
as a toy problem (Section V-B). The second set of experiments
evaluates the practicality of the privacy partitioning in pro-
tecting the sensitive information of input data using the LFW
dataset (Section V-C). At last, we validate the effectiveness of
our framework on the state-of-the-art very deep CNN using
the CIFAR-10 dataset (Section V-D).
A. Evaluation Metrics
How to judge the privacy leakage in images has long
remained challenging in the field of computer vision. Different
users might have different privacy requirements in different ap-
plications. For example, some users might not want to disclose
the gender/age information of portrait images while he/she
would still want to upload portrait images for deep learning
services. In general cases, computer vision researchers use
indistinguishable metrics to evaluate the quality of images
compared to the benchmark images. Many algorithms and
metrics [11]–[14] have been proposed to quantify the human
perceptual capability over images. Many Studies based on
user studies and statistical evaluations have been proved these
metrics like Structural Similarity (SSIM) index are highly
consistent with human perceptual capability on different image
quality measurement datasets [15]–[18]. In the experiments
below, we will use a combination of metrics discussed below
to measure the indistinguishability of the recovered images by
the attacker and as the proxy of the image privacy metrics.
MSE: The mean squared error (MSE) measures the per-
pixel l-2 Euclidean distance between two images. It is usually
used to measure the quality of image reconstruction. In the
context of image or video compression, it is often used
as an approximation to human perception of reconstruction
quality. However, the MSE is insufficient to assess highly-
structured images since it assumes pixel-wise independence.
For example, blurring an image can result in small l-2 changes
but large perceptual changes. If MSE = 0, two images are
identical.
SSIM: The structural similarity index (SSIM) improves on
MSE by assuming pixel-wise dependence [11]. It is computed
on a sliding window to capture the structural information
between two images. It ranges from [−1, 1], where SSIM = 1
indicates that the two images are identical. SSIM is highly
consistent with human perceptual capability so that image
obfuscation techniques such as pixelation and blurring would
result in smaller SSIM values.
DPD: Recently, studies have been shown that internal acti-
vations of deep convolutional networks trained on image in-
ferences are surprisingly useful to capture perceptual loss that
correspond to human visual perception [19], [20] especially
in terms of perceptual spatial ambiguities. In our experiment,
we use the deep perceptual distance (DPD) proposed in [20]
to evaluate the perceptual indistinguishability of recovered
images as a complementary metric of SSIM and MSE.
Reprint accuracy: The reprint accuracy is a measure of the
model classification accuracy using recovered inputs by the
attacker (i.e., the classification accuracy of f : H → X → Y).
It can be a proxy metric to measure how much information
loss of the recovered inputs compared to the original inputs.
B. Preliminary Validation of Privacy Partitioning using
MNIST Dataset
As a preliminary step, we test the effectiveness of our
method with a simple benchmark dataset. We choose one of
the most commonly used Image benchmark datasets MNIST to
start our tests. Experiments on MNIST show that our solution
can make it much harder for attackers to recover input data
during model inference phase. Since MNIST contains less
sensitive data, we then run experiments on face image to
show that our approach can protect private information such
as gender while still provide high classification accuracy of
face identification, see details in Section V-C.
We use the MNIST dataset [21] to learn the
handwriting-to-digit classifier network. MNIST
is a benchmark computer vision dataset containing 60,000
gray-scale images of handwritten digits (50,000 training
and 10,000 testing). We use a three-layer ReLU-based
fully-connected feed-forward neural network with 800 hidden
units in each layer as our model. We refer to this model as
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Fig. 3: Handwritten Digit Image Recovery: This figure compares the input images (a) to a handwriting-to-digit
classifier network to the images recovered by the two-layer ReLU-based neural network from this classifier network’s
intermediate layer output when the privacy partition is not applied (b) and when the privacy partition is applied (c). The
input to the recovery network consists of the intermediate layer output passed between the local domain and the remote domain
of the classifier network. The MSE for the images in (b) and (c) are ≈0.07 and ≈0.11 (SSIM ≈0.55 and ≈0.35), respectively.
handwriting-to-digit classifier network. In the model
inference phase, the first two layers are deployed on the
local side and the last layer is deployed in the remote side.
The attacker then leverages the output of the local layers to
recover input images.
In all of our experiment settings for MNIST, the model
and the defender(s) are trained using the Adam optimization
algorithm [22]. We set the learning rate of the model and the
defender at 0.0001 and 0.001, respectively. We train the model
and the defender for 500 epochs with a batch size of 32. we
also use the dropout technique [23] with a drop probability of
0.1 to prevent over-fitting.
We use the SSIM as the distance metric (defined in
Equation 2). We also use the Mean Square Error (MSE) loss as
the loss function for training the attacker models. We choose
MSE because it is typically used as the loss function in
computer vision task. Each attacker model is saved when the
MSE loss achieves its minimum during training.
We evaluate the quality of attack using both MSE and SSIM
between the recovered images by all attackers and the input
images in the test set.
(1) How do different defender weights affect the perfor-
mance of attackers?
First, we consider the case where the model provider uses
only one defender in the model learning phase. We set the
defender model as a two-layer ReLU-based neural network.
The attacker uses different network architectures to recover
the input images in the model inference phase. In order to try
out the different possible model architectures, we choose the
attacker models based on different combination of hyperpa-
rameters, such as activation function, number of hidden layers,
number of neuron per layer, etc. We choose 8 attacker models
in total. The details of chosen attacker models can be found
in Appendix A.
We set the defender weight λ (see in Equation 2) to be
0, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500 to see the corresponding model ac-
curacy and the quality of attacker recovered images (SSIM
and MSE). The results are shown in Table I.
Result Analysis: In Table I, we can clearly see that for
each attacker model, the overall trend of MSE increases (SSIM
decreases) with the increase of the defender weight, and in all
cases the inference accuracy still remains at the high level
(> 98%). The results demonstrate the effectiveness of our
framework: adding defender in our framework make it harder
for the attacker to recover input images while maintaining
the model inference accuracy. Figure 3 shows MNIST images
recovered by the two-layer ReLU-based neural network with
the defender present and without the defender present. We
can clearly see that with the defender present, the recovered
images by the attacker network is harder to recognize.
For all attacker models, the defender works to some extent
compared with the case of no defender. However, for some
attacker models such as Attacker 3 and Attacker 4 , even
though a defender is present when training the model, the
MSEs is still low (SSIM is still high). It indicates that the
single chosen defender architecture does not harden these two
attacker models enough.
(2) How do multiple defenders affect the performance of
multiple attackers?
We have shown that the chosen defender architecture in the
previous experiment cannot perfectly defend against multiple
different types of attackers. Next, we consider extending the
experiment by adding multiple defenders during the model
learning phase to defend against multiple attackers again.
We carefully select the 4 defenders based on our previous
experiments result: we choose those defender models which
perform the best (in both SSIM and MSE) as attacker models
in the previous experiment. The details of the chosen defenders
are in Appendix A.
As for the attacker networks, we use the same 8 attackers
used in the previous experiment for comparison to see how
the case of multiple defenders improves from that of a sin-
gle defender. We choose the defender weight λ as 200 for
comparison. Experiment results are shown in Table II.
Result Analysis: In Table II, we can clearly see that the
performance of each attacker model degrades by a large extent
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TABLE I: MNIST Model with Multiple Attackers Versus a Single Defender
Defender Weight 0 100 200 300 400 500
Model Accuracy 98.4% 98.2% 98.2% 98.1% 98.1% 98.1%
MSE/SSIM
Attacker 1 0.070/0.546 0.072/0.534 0.079/0.500 0.081/0.495 0.086/0.466 0.116/0.347
Attacker 2 0.072/0.524 0.068/0.553 0.080/0.500 0.082/0.491 0.093/0.449 0.117/0.361
Attacker 3 0.016/0.834 0.018/0.823 0.021/0.807 0.021/0.797 0.021/0.818 0.023/0.792
Attacker 4 0.022/0.783 0.021/0.794 0.025/0.755 0.025/0.765 0.023/0.787 0.025/0.760
Attacker 5 0.066/0.552 0.062/0.587 0.071/0.533 0.076/0.517 0.076/0.517 0.087/0.457
Attacker 6 0.074/0.514 0.070/0.543 0.087/0.457 0.097/0.420 0.092/0.448 0.131/0.298
Attacker 7 0.070/0.527 0.063/0.575 0.071/0.531 0.070/0.532 0.081/0.470 0.091/0.443
Attacker 8 0.032/0.734 0.037/0.713 0.046/0.659 0.049/0.637 0.048/0.640 0.061/0.558
The overall trend is a reduction in attacker recovery accuracy as defender weights are increased.
TABLE II: MNIST Model with Multiple Attacker versus Multiple
Defenders
Defenders Present
No
Defender
Single
Defender
Multiple
Defenders
Model Accuracy 98.4% 98.2% 98.0%
MSE
Attacker 1 0.070 0.079 0.215
Attacker 2 0.072 0.080 0.209
Attacker 3 0.016 0.021 0.070
Attacker 4 0.022 0.025 0.073
Attacker 5 0.066 0.071 0.195
Attacker 6 0.074 0.087 0.202
Attacker 7 0.070 0.071 0.168
Attacker 8 0.032 0.046 0.192
SSIM
Attacker 1 0.530 0.500 0.076
Attacker 2 0.540 0.500 0.098
Attacker 3 0.841 0.807 0.500
Attacker 4 0.820 0.755 0.494
Attacker 5 0.543 0.533 0.194
Attacker 6 0.518 0.457 0.117
Attacker 7 0.568 0.531 0.205
Attacker 8 0.722 0.659 0.160
when there are multiple defenders present, compared to the
performance of each attacker model when there is no or only
one defender present. This is because by training multiple
defenders in the model learning phase, the model can choose
the best defender in each step that has the best recover-ability
to optimize its parameters. This will harden the chance that
the attacker models recover the input images, and decrease
indistinguishability of the recovered images by the attacker.
However, adding more defenders during training always
mean more computing resources in practice. Therefore, we
should strike a balance between the availability of computing
resources or try to find a better and more representative
defender model architecture which greatly decrease the in-
evitability of local layers of the model given the data distri-
bution.
C. Protecting Private Information in Face Dataset
We use the Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW) dataset [24] to
learn the face recognition classifier network photo-to-id.
The LFW dataset contains 13,233 images of faces collected
from the web and each face was labeled with the name of
the person in the picture. There are 1,680 people who have at
least two distinct images. The size of the images is 250×250.
We only retain images of people that have at least 30 different
pictures and re-scale the images to 64× 64. This is a typical
input pipeline of face recognition. After filtering, there are
2,370 images left with 34 subjects in total. We split 80% as
the training set and the rest 20% as the testing set in a stratified
fashion.
We use the CNN as the classifier. The details of the CNN
classifier architecture is in Appendix B.
During the model learning phase, the defender architecture
we add for training the classifier is similar to the “reversed”
version of the local layers. The defender “reverses” the model
operations to get the input images from the output of local
layers (e.g., to reverse the input of convolution operation or
a pooling operation, the defender perform a deconvolution
operation on the hidden-layer features [25]). This type of
architecture resembles the design strategy of a convolutional
autoencoder [26], [27].
The model and the defender are trained using SGD algo-
rithm with momentum 0.9 and initial learning rate 0.01. The
learning rate decays by a factor of 0.1 every 100 epochs, and
there are 250 epochs in total. l-2 regularization is also applied
to prevent over-fitting. The defender’s weight λ is set to be 0.1
so that the model inference performance is at an acceptable
level.
In the model inference phase, we choose the attacker archi-
tecture based on decoder designs the autoencoder [26], [27].
We choose three different types of attacker models to recover
the input images: (1) the attacker model with deconvolution
layer as its main component to recover the input images;
(2) the attacker model that use fully-connected layers as
its main component; (3) the attacker model that use sparse
fully-connected layers as its main component (we introduce
the sparsity of the network by dropout techniques [23]). We
choose these types of attackers since they are the most com-
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Fig. 4: Faces Photo Recovery: This figure compares nine sample images recovered by six configurations (2 defender configurations
by 3 partition configurations) of classifier network photo-to-id. Note that the recovery error both increase as a defender is applied
to the privacy partition (bottom-to-top trend) and as more layers are included in the local partition Θl (left-to-right trend) (refer to
Figure 5 for the full results of the photo-to-id experiments).
monly used decoder architecture in auto-encoder designs [26]
and they cover the most commonly used operations in deep
neural networks in the area of computer vision. The detailed
architectures of the attacker models are in Appendix B.
(1) Where should we place the privacy partitioning on our
model
To strike a balance between model utility and data privacy,
we should choose the intermediate layer whose hidden state
is difficult for the attacker to recover the input images while
also maintaining the model classification accuracy. A question
arises that which layer we should choose for the privacy
partitioning.
To answer the question, we choose different layers for the
privacy partitionings in the model learning phase. We choose
the output of the first, second and third pooling layer (denoted
by pool1, pool2, pool3) for privacy partitionings (see
Appendix B for details). We choose these layers because the
outputs of these layers represent different levels of abstraction
of features in the model in the feature extraction module in
the CNNs [28].
In the model inference phase, we use three types of attacker
models mentioned above to recover input images. We measure
the SSIM, MSE, deep perceptual distance and reprint accuracy
between the input images and the recovered images by all
three attackers to evaluate the quality of attacks. We also keep
track of the model inference accuracy. We conduct all our
experiments with and without the presence of the defender
for comparison. Figure 5 (a)-(e) shows the results of the best
attacks. Note that we run all of the experiments five times and
compute the average.
As we can see from Figure 5 (a), the privacy partitionings
still keeps the model inference accuracy at a good level: in all
layers we test, the model accuracy is greater than 88%. We
also notice that by putting the privacy partitionings in “deeper”
layers, the degradation of model performance is less than that
of putting the privacy partitioning in the first layer pool1.
Figure 5 (b) shows for all privacy partitionings in all layers,
our framework makes it hard for the deep neural network
classifier to classify them correctly (reprint accuracy). The
over trend of reprint accuracy decrease as we deploy the
privacy partitionings in the deeper layers.
In Figure 5 (c)-(e), we consider three perceptual metrics
discussed in Section V-A to evaluate the quality of recovered
images. It is obvious that the defender deteriorates the quality
of recovered input images for all perceptual metrics concerned.
The results also suggest that by deploying the privacy parti-
tionings in the deeper layers, the recovered image by more
indistinguishable to human. Figure 4 shows the visualization
results.
Overall, since our goal is to maintain the model inference
accuracy while keeping recovery error of the attacker as high
as possible, combined with the all five metrics we consider,
deeper layers such as pool3 are the best positions for the
privacy partitioning. However, deploying more layers in the
local domain would compromise the intellectual property of
the deep learning models. The model providers and users
should have a trade-off between model privacy and data
privacy. We confirm this conclusion in Section V-D.
(2) Obfuscation of other private attributes
We demonstrate that our method can harden the attacker
from learning other sensitive attributes from the recovered
inputs. In this experiment, we perform gender estimation for
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Fig. 5: Face Identification and Object Recognition Results: This figure shows the results for 6 configurations of the photo-to-id
classifier network (charts a-e) and image-to-object classifier network (charts f-j), measured in terms of five performance criteria.
The configurations includes 2 defender configurations by 3 partition point selections: H0 (pool1 activation), H1 (pool2 activation), H2
(pool3 activation). The 5 performance criteria include the privacy partition model inference accuracy; the reprint accuracy; the structural
similarity index (SSIM) of recovered and originals images; the mean squared error (MSE) of recovered and originals images; and the
deep perceptual distance (DPD) of recovered and originals images.
the recovered images of faces by the attacker. We still use LFW
dataset in this experiment since there are gender labels for each
face image. Note that all the attacker models are trained for
different privacy partitionings in the previous section.
The standard pipelines of gender estimation are divided into
two steps: The first step is to detect the face location in the
images; The second step is to perform gender classification for
each detected face. For the first step, we run the most com-
monly used HOG+SVM face detection algorithm to extract
faces from images; For the second step, we use the pretrained
Wide Residual Network [29] for gender classification. The
results are shown in Table III.
TABLE III: Gender Estimation Results
No Defense
pool1 pool2 pool3
#CG / #DF / #TI #CG / #DF / #TI #CG / #DF / #TI
414 / 459 / 474 408 / 448 / 474 283 / 309 / 474
Has Defense
pool1 pool2 pool3
#CG / #DF / #TI #CG / #DF / #TI #CG / #DF / #TI
359 / 390 / 474 247 / 276 / 474 66 / 76 / 474
This table shows the results of gender estimation from the recovered images
by the attacker. #CG is the number of correctly classified faces for gender
estimation; #DF is the number of detected faces for all images; #TI is the
total number of images.
In Table III, we can clearly see that the number of correctly
classified faces for gender estimation (#CG) and the number
of detected faces for all images (#DF) are significantly fewer
when privacy partitioning is applied for all three partition
points. Thus, we conclude that our method hardens the attacker
from learning other sensitive attributes from the recovered
inputs.
(3) Insight of defender’s role when training the model
PSfrag replacements
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Fig. 6: Hidden Layers and Defender Strategy: This figure
shows the impact of defender strategy on the hidden layer ac-
tivations of the photo-to-id classifier network. The hidden
layer activation visualizations are outputs of pooling layer H0
when there is no defender present (a) and when there is a
defender present (b).
Our experiment results demonstrate quantitatively and qual-
itatively the effectiveness of our method. In order to have
a more intuitive understanding of why the defender is ef-
fective, we compare the visualizations of the hidden layer
activation we protect. From the visualization comparisons, we
can qualitatively check how the defender helps protect the
information of hidden layer features from leaking privacy-
invasive characteristics.
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We design the following experiments to gain better insights
of our method: given an image, we visualize the filter activa-
tions of the hidden layers where deploy the privacy partitioning
in grey-scale images. We compare the “protected” activations
with those without protection. Note that we choose the activa-
tion pool1 and pool2 for visualization since deeper layer
features hard for a human to interpret semantically. Figure 6
shows the visualization results for pool1. The rest of the
visualization results are in Appendix B.
We can clearly see from Figure 6 the differences between
hidden layer activation of pool1 with and without the de-
fender. In Figure 6 (a), we can see more clear human visually-
recognizable features in more filter activation, whereas in
Figure 6 (b), we can only capture the features such as the
basic outlines of human faces in fewer filter activations.
From these results, we know that our method works by em-
phasizing “key” features for the original task and deactivating
“redundant” but maybe “sensitive” features that do not help
much for inference to increase privacy loss. Combined with
the model classification accuracy results shown in Figure 5
(a), we can conclude that performing the privacy partitioning
in the proper layer not only maintain the model inference
performance (emphasizing “key” features) but also make it
harder for the attacker to “steal” more information from
input images (deactivating “redundant” but maybe “sensitive”
features).
D. Privacy Partitioning in very Deep CNN using CIFAR-10
Dataset
In this experiment, we continue to demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of our framework in very deep CNN model. We
use CIFAR-10 dataset [30] in the experiment. CIFAR-10 is
one of the benchmark datasets for object recognition and it
contains 50, 000 training images and 10, 000 test images. We
use VGG-19 [31] as the model in this experiment. VGG-19 is
one the most commonly used and state-of-the-art deep CNN
models. The hyperparameters used in training and network
architectures of the defender and the attackers can be found
in Appendix C.
(1) Deployment strategy for very deep CNN model
We conduct parallel experiments similar to Section V-C to
verify the deployment strategy for very deep CNN model.
The quantitative results are shown in Figure 5 (f)-(j) and the
visualization results are shown in Appendix C.
The results in Figure 5 in (f)-(j) demonstrate that our
method works very well in the very deep CNN model. For the
privacy partitioning deployments in all layers, the decrease in
model accuracy is less than 2%: 1.6%, 1.0%, 0.2% drop in
pool1, pool2, pool3, respectively (see in Figure 5 (f)). In
the mean time, the indistinguishability of the recovered images
by the best attacker decrease as the privacy partitioning is
deployed in “deeper” layers (see in Figure 5 (g)-(j)). Thus, we
can draw the similar conclusion about the privacy partitioning
in deep CNN model as in Section V-C.
(2) Continue training on the remote layers
Since our partition strategy fits well the concept fine-
tuning [32] in DNNs. We can continue fine-tuning the remote
layers for better model performance while keeping the local
layers unchanged. We fine-tune our pretrained model in all
settings we tested before. We observe 0.2% − 0.3% increase
in model inference accuracy for all privacy partitioning de-
ployments in pool1, pool2, pool3.
(3) Comparison with differential private image publication
We compare the privacy partitioning with differential private
image pixelation in [33]. Their work extends standard differen-
tial privacy notion to image data. Their threat model is similar
to us: they consider that the image owners wish to share one
or more images to the untrusted recipients. They propose the
notion of m-neighborhood for image data: two images are
neighboring images if they have the same dimension and they
differ by at most m pixels. They argue that the m-differences
of pixels can help to protect the presence or absence of any
sensitive information in the image (e.g. object, text, or person).
They propose a Differentially Private Pixelation algorithm that
achieves ǫ-differential privacy (see in Appendix D for details).
They validate the effectiveness of the algorithm by SSIM.
We apply their algorithm for the CIFAR-10 dataset in the
model inference phase on the pretrained model. We set the
pixelation grid cell length to be 2 and m to be 1 to minimize
the negative effect image utility [33]. We change the value
of ǫ to see how SSIM and the classification accuracy change
accordingly. The results are shown in Figure 7.
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Fig. 7: Differentially Private Image Pixelation Results: the
figure shows that as privacy parameter ǫ in differentially private
image pixelation become larger, both SSIM and classification
accuracy increase.
As we can see from Figure 7, the classification accuracy
drops significantly. Compared to our method (see Figure 5
(f) and (g)), our method achieve similar SSIM while still
keeping the classification accuracy nearly unchanged. This
demonstrates our method is more practical in the real world
scenario.
VI. RELATED WORK
This line of research spans several active research areas.
In this section, we discuss the related research in the areas
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of machine learning privacy threats and privacy-preserving
solutions of deep learning with a comparison to our work.
A. Machine Learning Privacy Threats
Data privacy of machine learning has been an active re-
search topic for long. In one of the newest works, Hitaj,
et al. [34] posit that there are fundamental limitations to the
level of privacy that can be achieved using a decentralized
approach to training deep learning models. This work intro-
duces a side-channel attack to decentralized deep learning that
leverages a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) – i.e., a
model that produces samples from the same distribution as the
training set (prototypical samples) given model parameters –
to disclose distinctive, potentially privacy-invasive attributes
of training data from other honest participants.
Song et al. [35] consider a malicious machine learning
services provider who supplies model-training code to the
data-holder. They demonstrate that the model capacity of deep
neural networks can be abused to secretly encode the subset
of the training set while still keeping the predictive power of
deep learning models.
Fredrikson et al. [36] explore model inversion attack: they
show that model inversion could lead to unexpected privacy
threats by leveraging confidence values given by machine
learning models. They evaluate their attack over decision trees
for ML-as-a-service and simple facial recognition models such
as MLP and Softmax Regression.
Shokri et al. [37] study membership inference attacks: they
assume a black-box access to a machine learning inference
model and determine whether a labeled data instance appears
in the training data that is used to train the model. Other
membership inference problems are studied in [38]–[41]
Model privacy in machine learning is another important
research area. Trame`r et al. [42] demonstrate the feasibility of
duplicating the functionality of machine learning models such
as decision tree and Logistics Regression in ML-as-a-service
(MLaaS) system. They term it as model extraction attack.
Wang et al. [43] propose hyperparameter stealing attacks and
demonstrate its effectiveness theoretically and empirically in
machine learning models like logistics regression and support
vector machine.
B. Privacy-preserving Solutions of Deep Learning
1) Differential privacy: Differential privacy originates from
the domain of database and it provides formal privacy guar-
antees for each individual data record in the database. Dif-
ferential privacy has been applied to ensuring the privacy
of training data of deep learning to protect against the case
that the model provider could learn from model parameters
whether the individual data is present or not [44], [45].
However, our threat model is different and it is hard to
directly apply the standard differential privacy notion in our
case: for the task of image publication for MLaaS, we often
send image data to the model provider to request for the certain
services for that particular image data and the information
leakage by directly sending to the model provider is not guar-
antee by differential privacy. In summary, standard differential
privacy is for protecting the privacy of individual entries in
a confidential database (which is well defined for training a
machine learning model), whereas the privacy partitioning is
for training a deep network in such a way that inputs for
classification are protected. They are complementary but not
directly comparable. In summary, differential privacy provides
privacy/anonymity for the individual samples training database
while the privacy partitioning provides privacy during model
inference.
Erlingsson et al. [46] propose a Randomized Aggregated
Privacy-Preserving Ordinal Response (RAPPOR) to provide
strong privacy guarantees for crowdsourcing population statis-
tics from end-users. However, a user might send a single data
item for MLaaS system. Thus, RAPPOR cannot be applied
to this scenario if a user might send a single data item for
MLaaS.
Fan et al. [33] also extend the standard notion of differential
privacy to image privacy for image publication. However,
their method suffers from low data utility compared with our
method (Section V-D).
2) Collaborative Training: Shokri et al. [7] propose a col-
laborative deep learning framework to render multiple parties
to learn a deep neural network without uploading their data
to the remote server in the model learning phase. Each local
party has a copy of the model that can upload and download
parameters during training, so that the model is trained without
uploading the data to the central server party. However, the
deployment of the model in the local side would increase
the local computing powers and leak the model privacy. Our
approach complements this framework by deploying part of
the model in the local domain in the model inference phase.
McMahan et al. [6] propose a federated averaging algorithm
to protect the privacy of training data. Instead of uploading
data directly to a remote server, the client trains model locally
and uploads updated parameters to the central model. Still, our
work complements it since we aim to protect data privacy in
the model inference phase.
3) Cryptography for Deep Learning: Cryptography-based
protocols have long been used in machine learning models
to protect data privacy [9], [47]–[49]. Liu et al. [8] present
cryptography-based oblivious protocols to protect data privacy
in model inference phase for deep learning model. They design
oblivious protocols for linear transformations, popular acti-
vation functions and pooling operations using secret sharing
and garbled circuits in online prediction phase and perform
request-independent operations using homomorphic encryp-
tion together with single instruction multiple data (SIMD)
batch processing technique. Since the method requires no
change in the pretrained model, our approach is complemen-
tary with theirs. Furthermore, our method is compatible with
all cryptography-based protocols in principle.
VII. CONCLUSION
We evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed privacy parti-
tioning framework and find experimentally that it a promising
method for significantly reducing the capacity for an adversary
with access to intermediate layer activation or a significant
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portion of a deep network topology to conduct input recovery
attacks. We develop and evaluate the privacy partitioning
framework in the context of a novel threat model and often
used deployment context. Future work in this research will
explore integration with compatible deep learning privacy
protections, integration with software and hardware security
modules used to secure a local domain, as well as the
formal guarantee of our method in different neural network
configurations and data distributions.
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APPENDIX
A. Hyperparamter setting in MNIST experiment
In this section, we will describe some of the experiment
details for MNIST dataset. Here are all attacker networks used
in our MNIST experiment:
• Attacker 1 : 800 → Relu → 800 → Sigmoid
• Attacker 2 : 800→ Relu→ dropout(0.1)→ 800
→ Sigmoid
• Attacker 3 : 800 → Tanh → 800 → Sigmoid
• Attacker 4 : 800 → Sigmoid → 800 → Sigmoid
• Attacker 5 : 512 → Relu → 512 → Sigmoid
• Attacker 6 : 1024 → Relu → 1024 → Sigmoid
• Attacker 7 : 1-D conv→ Relu→ 800→ Sigmoid
• Attacker 8 : 784 → Sigmoid
Here are the defender models used in the multiple defender
training experiments:
• Defender 1 : 800 → Tanh → 800 → Sigmoid
• Defender 2 : 800 → Sigmoid → 800 → Sigmoid
• Defender 3 : 1-D conv → Relu → 800 →
Sigmoid
• Defender 4 : 784 → Sigmoid
B. Hyperparamter setting in face ID experiment
We use the CNN model for Face ID recogition. The model
used for face ID experiment is:
conv2d 5×5 → conv2d 5×5 → maxpool 2×2
(pool1)→ conv2d 3×3→ conv2d 3×3→ maxpool
2×2 (pool1) → conv2d 3×3 → conv2d 3×3 →
maxpool 2×2 (pool3) → conv2d 3×3 → conv2d
3×3 → maxpool 2×2 → 512 → dropout(0.5) →
512 → dropout(0.5) → 512
Note that each convolutional layer is followed by the Relu
activation and batch-normalization layer.
The design of defender model depends on which layer for
partition (e.g., in our experiment, we choose the the outputs
of first three pooling layers pool1, pool2, and pool3 for
partition). For example, if we choose pool2 for partition, the
architecture of defender network would be the reversed version
of local layers:
deconv2d 3×3 (stride 2) → conv2d 3×3 →
Relu → deconv2d 5×5 (stride 2) → deconv2d
5×5 → tanh
Note that this type of architecture resembles the design strat-
egy of an convolutional autoencoder [26], [27]. The attacker
networks also depend on which layer for partition since the
input dimension might be different from layer to layer. For
example, if we choose pool2 for partition, the attacker is
• Attacker 1 (DECONV ATTACKER): deconv2d
3×3 (stride 2) → conv2d 3×3 → Relu →
deconv2d 5×5 (stride 2) → deconv2d 5×5
→ tanh
• Attacker 2 (FC ATTACKER): 4096 → Relu →
12288 → Tanh
• Attacker 3 (SPARSE FC ATTACKER): 4096 →
Relu → dropout(0.5) → 12288 → Tanh
Note that these types of attackers are chosen since they
are the most commonly used decoder architecture in auto-
encoder designs [26] and they cover the most commonly used
operations in deep neural networks in the area of computer
vision.
PSfrag replacements
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Fig. 8: Hidden Layers and Defender Strategy II: This figure
shows the impact of the defender strategy on the pool2
activations (hidden layer H1) of the photo-to-id classifier
network. Applying the defender strategy (b) results in more
information loss to the intermediate layer features a compared
to training normally (a).
C. Hyperparamter setting in CIFAR10 experiment
We used batch-normalized VGG-19 [31] for the classifica-
tion model. We train the model with random crop and random
horizontal flip data augmentation techniques for 150 epochs.
The initial learning rate is 0.01 with a decay factor of 0.1 for
every 50 epochs. we use SGD algorithm with momentum 0.9
and l-2 penalty weight decay 0.0005.
The design strategies of defender and attacker networks are
similar in the face ID experiment. For example, if we choose
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the second pooling layer pool2 for partition, the defender
network is:
deconv2d 3×3 (stride 2) → BatchNorm →
Relu → deconv2d 3×3 (stride 2) → BatchNorm
→ Relu → deconv2d 3×3 → BatchNorm
And the attacker networks are:
• Attacker 1 (DECONV ATTACKER): deconv2d 3×3
(stride 2)→ BatchNorm→ Relu→ deconv2d
3×3 (stride 2) → BatchNorm → Relu →
deconv2d 3×3 → BatchNorm
• Attacker 2 (FC ATTACKER): 1024→ Relu→ 3072
• Attacker 3 (SPARSE FC ATTACKER): 1024 →
Relu → dropout(0.5) → 3072
For the outputs of the attacker networks, we will also clip
them to match the normalized image pixel range.
D. Differentially Private Image Pixelation
In this section we will discuss the the notion of differentially
private image pixelation [33] and how to achieve it. To apply
the notion of differential privacy to image, they define the
notion of “neighboring images”.
Definition [m-Neighborhood] Two images I1 and I2 are
neighboring images if they have the same dimension and they
differ by at most m pixels.
To achieve ǫ-differential privacy, they also propose Differen-
tially Private Pixelation algorithm. The details of the algorithm
are in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Differentially Private Image Pixelation pix
Input : Input Image I with size M ×N , neighbouring
parameter m, pixelation grid size b, privacy
parameter ǫ
Output : Differentially private image I˜
Divide I into K = ⌈M
b
⌉⌈N
b
⌉ cells ck, where
k = 1, . . . , ⌈M
b
⌉⌈N
b
⌉ ;
Pixelate the image
p(I; b) = {
1
b2
∑
(x,y)∈c1
I(x, y), . . . ,
1
b2
∑
(x,y)∈cK
I(x, y)}
Sample Laplacian noises N˜ = {N˜1, N˜2, . . . , N˜K} with
means 0 and and scales 255m
b2ǫ
;
Add noises to the pixelated image I˜ = I + N˜;
return I˜;
Theorem 1 Algorithm 2 is ǫ-differential private.
Proof. The global sensitivity of Algorithm 2 is ∆ =
maxI1,I2 |pix(I1) − pix(I2)| =
255m
b2
for any neighboring
images I1, I2. By Theorem 2 in [50], we can conclude that
Algorithm 2 is ǫ-differential private.
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Fig. 9: Hidden Layer Features of CIFAR-10 Data: This figure shows the impact of the defender strategy on different object classes.
Privacy partitioning introduces sparsity to hidden layer features to increase information loss as compared to training the deep network
normally.
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Fig. 10: CIFAR-10 Data Recovery: This figure shows the sample images recovery visualization results. The application of the privacy
partitioning hardens the input recovery for all layer configurations and the recovery error increases as more layers are included in the
local partition Θl.
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